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 This policy study assesses how concepts of monitoring IT (Information 
Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) mitigate the success of Russian Offensive 
Cyber Operations (OCO) against critical infrastructure. The study answers, "how can 
monitoring systems that surveil both IT and OT mitigate offensive Russian cyber 
operations against critical infrastructure?" Current scholarship shows substantial efforts 
to reform cyber defenses – exemplified by the US's changes since the early 2000s. 
Although reforms resulted in new defensive programs, they contributed to a convoluted 
system that made private-public cooperation difficult. Combined with technological 
trends that emphasized cost-efficiencies, these reforms created a contentious balance 
between private and public organizations where infrastructure providers valued costs over 
security. This unfortunate position supports Russia's strategy. Russian cyber-attacks since 
2007 illustrate increasingly destructive capabilities that manipulate critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and weak defenses.  
 This study examines Russian cyber-attacks since 2007 to test if Moscow's cyber 
tactics create abnormal behavioral traits that modern surveillance, IT-OT monitoring, 
could detect. Through comparative case studies of Russian OCO, the study builds 
common TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) and possible warning signs. The 
results are the foundation of several policy recommendations. The study used data from 
established technical trade associates, non-governmental organizations, government 
agencies, translated Russian strategy documents, and scholarly literature that discussed 
Russia's cyber activities. 
 The analysis indicates that Russia's offensive cyber creates several observable 
behavioral traits that IT-OT monitoring would detect, mitigating Russian OCO's success 
iii 
against critical infrastructure. However, the technique needs to intervene when an 
attacker is in initial set-up phases, as the beginning segments of a Russian OCO are the 
most vulnerable to detection. The study recommends streamlining government 
cybersecurity and regulatory agencies, providing the necessary intelligence to customize 
defensive systems, and broadening access to commercial solutions. These steps would 
help create a collaborative relationship between the public and private sector while 
encouraging the broad adoption of IT-OT monitoring. The study concludes that the 
government should focus on policies that support industry to encourage cybersecurity 
modernization and avoid problems seen in America's reforms during the 2000s.  
Primary Reader and Advisor: Professor Sarah Clark 
Secondary Readers: Professor Michael Warner and Professor Mark Young 
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Introduction: Russian Offensive Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Reforms 
Modern cyber-attacks are technically complex and can inflict physical damage, 
making the security of critical infrastructure vital. Russia is one of the primary threats for 
offensive cyber, and it has a history of targeting critical infrastructure dating back to the 
late 1990s. US cybersecurity reforms in the 2000s noted that early Russian cyber 
aggression could lead to attacking critical infrastructure. While new agencies, authorities, 
and defensive programs tried to address various cyber threats, they helped create a culture 
where private organizations focus on costs over security because of confusing federal 
processes and authorities. These trends became compounded by technological 
movements that focused on automation and streamlining security. As the Russian cyber 
threat evolves, detailed research surrounding modern cybersecurity is crucial to providing 
policymakers with actionable recommendations on changing private-public cybersecurity 
relationships while learning from past mistakes. 
This policy study aims to answer the following research question: "how can 
monitoring systems that surveil IT (Information Technology) and OT (Operational 
Technology) mitigate offensive Russian cyber operations against critical infrastructure?" 
Answering this question requires an in-depth study of modern Russian cyber-attacks to 
determine a standard set of tactics that Moscow typically leverages against critical 
infrastructure. These common characteristics are necessary to see if they create abnormal 
behavioral cyber traits that threat-informed surveillance, such as IT-OT monitoring, can 
detect – thus, mitigating Russian OCO success rates. This study aims to create policy 
recommendations for defending critical infrastructure by looking at literature about 
Russian cyber capabilities and cybersecurity scholarship. 
2 
Common Definitions to Frame the Policy Study 
Critical Infrastructure 
Typically, election-related components are not part of critical infrastructure 
definitions – DHS (Department of Homeland Security) does not include this component.1  
However, the scope and breadth of Russian cyber operations against the US Presidential 
election in 2016 warrants adding this element. Therefore, this study defines critical 
infrastructure as vital physical, cyber, or technological assets that contribute to a 
country's operation and whose incapacitation would debilitate economic, political, or 
public safety.2,3,4  
Offensive Cyber Operation (OCO) 
Offensive Cyber Operation's definition stems from the US military's doctrine 
written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Russian strategy from Moscow's Ministry of 
Defense. The study's definition focuses on offensive or destructive acts in cyberspace. 
This study defines OCO as a destructive computer network activity that deliberately 
 
1 DHS.gov. “Critical Infrastructure Security.” Department of Homeland Security. 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security.  
2 Eric Manpearl. "Securing US Election Systems: Designating US Election Systems as Critical 
Infrastructure and Instituting Election Security Reforms." BU Journal of Science. & Technology. L. 24 
(2018): p. 168-169. https://www.bu.edu/jostl/files/2018/03/5-Manpearl-Online-Version.pdf  
3Arjen Boin and Allan McConnell. "Preparing for critical infrastructure breakdowns: the limits of crisis 
management and the need for resilience." Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 15, no. 1 
(2007): p. 50-51. 
http://www.academia.edu/download/39525042/Preparing_for_Critical_Infrastructure_Br20151029-30676-
1u12me.pdf  
4 DHS, “Critical Infrastructure Security” 
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causes harmful effects against a technology-related target, critical infrastructure, or 
associated supporting components using technical means.5,6,7  
Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) 
One of the leading associations on cybersecurity for infrastructure, the SANS 
Institute, defines IT as a broader set of systems that processes, stores, or transmits data – 
a corporate intra-network, for example. The SANS Institute defines OT as hardware or 
software that manages physical equipment. For example, these can include power 
controls and safety systems.8 
IT-OT Monitoring 
According to Knapp, Langill, and DHS, IT-OT monitoring – sometimes referred 
to as advanced persistent diligence – relies on the concept of defense-in-depth, which 
calls for monitoring across multiple network layers.9,10 The surveillance requires 
"detecting and alerting an organization of an intrusion early on so they (the organization) 
can take defensive action before critical assets are breached."11 By relying on anomaly 
 
5 “Cyberspace Operations.” Joint Publication 3-12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 8, 2019. p. 1-13, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf?ver=2018-07-16-134954-150.  
6 James E. Cartwright (General, VCJCS). “Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations.” Memorandum 
for Chiefs of The Military Services Commanders of The Combatant Commands Directors of The Joint 
Staff Directorates. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2010. p. 1-3, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=734860.  
7 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Концептуальные взгляды на деятельность 
Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в информационном пространстве. (Conceptual Views 
Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Information Space) 
(Moscow, 2011). p. 1-3. https://eng.mil.ru/en/science/publications/more.htm?id=10845074@cmsArticle 
8 Derek R. Harp and Bengt Gregory-Brown. “IT/OT Convergence: Bridging the Divide.” White Paper. The 
SANS Institute and Nex Defense, 2014. p. 1-3, https://ics.sans.org/media/IT-OT-Convergence-
NexDefense-Whitepaper.pdf. 
9 “Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth 
Strategies.” ICS-CERT White Paper. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, September 
2016. p. 27, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-
CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf?force_isolation=true. 
10 Eric D. Knapp, and Joel Thomas Langill. Industrial Network Security: Securing Critical Infrastructure 
Networks for Smart Grid, SCADA, and other Industrial Control Systems. Syngress, 2014. p. 30-36; 50-53. 
11 DHS, “Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-
Depth Strategies,” 27 
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detection logic, IT-OT monitoring specifically looks for observable intrusion behaviors to 
alert defenders of possible attacks. These are actions outside what an authorized user 
would conduct in their daily duties that indicate possible malicious intentions.12  
Figure 1: Cyber Kill Chain Details13,14 
Cyber Kill Chain 
 The cyber kill chain is a series of standard phases that are common to most 
computer network attacks. For cyber intrusions, the goal is to develop an attack vector, 
breach the target, establish a presence, and deliver a desired action on the objective. 
Based on these goals, a generalized cyber kill chain has the following characteristics: 
 
12 Ibid, 15-32 
13 Ibid 
14 Hutchins et al. 3-5 
5 
reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, Command and 
Control (C2), and actions on objectives.15,16 
Policy Issue Background: The Russian Cyber Threat and Troubled Reforms 
 In the 2000s, America passed several cybersecurity reforms in response to rising 
state-supported cyber threats. Unfortunately, the policies created a disjointed set of 
policies.17 Reforms like Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 7, the Energy Policy Act, 
establishing the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC), and creating the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) were a 
cornerstone of America's cyber defenses.18,19 Although these policies created a sizeable 
federal cybersecurity apparatus, the changes contributed to confusing initiatives that 
separated cyber defense and regulatory authorities – which hurt collaboration with private 
industry – according to the Congressional Research Service.20 
The study reviews US reform efforts as an example of problematic policy 
approaches to cybersecurity because of greater data availability. However, current 
scholarship indicates that other Western-aligned nations experienced similar fragmented 
private-public relationships resulting from government-focused cybersecurity 
 
15Hutchins, Eric M., Michael J. Cloppert, and Rohan M. Amin. “Intelligence-Driven Computer Network 
Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains.” Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, January 2011. p. 3-5. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-
martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf. 
16 Spitzner, Lance. “Applying Security Awareness to the Cyber Kill Chain.” SANS Institute, May 31, 2019. 
p. 1-5. https://www.sans.org/security-awareness-training/blog/applying-security-awareness-cyber-kill-
chain.  
17 Paul Parfomak, Richard Campbell, and Chris Jaikaran. “Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems: 
DOE Programs.” CRS Report. Congressional Research Service, August 28, 2017. p. 17-20, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44939. 
18 Parfomak et al. 4-9; 17-20 
19 “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks.” Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, June 2011. p. 1-3. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/preventing-and-defending-against-cyber-
attacks.pdf.  
20 Parfomak et al. 4-9; 17-20 
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reforms.21,22 Combining cyber behavioral warning signs exhibited by Russian OCO that 
modern defensive techniques, IT-OT monitoring, can detect with policy lessons learned 
from the 2000s are crucial to a more successful private-public cybersecurity relationship. 
An interdisciplinary methodology that also leverages an understanding of Russia's 
approach to offensive cyber would enable policy-relevant conclusions to improve the 
adoption of modern cybersecurity techniques. Russia maintains a destructive view of 
offensive cyber, and its harmful actions since at least the 1990s demonstrate a pressing 
threat. It is vital to comprehend how an adversary thinks about the strategic, operational, 
and tactical application of a capability while examining why current policy approaches 
are problematic. 
Framing the Threat: Russian OCO Uses the Online Domain to Cripple Adversaries 
Russia's use of cyberspace originates in the late 1990s.23 During the Moonlight 
Maze campaign of 1999, Russian hackers stole data from the DoD (Department of 
Defense), DoE (Department of Energy), NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration), and several military contractors. The Moonlight Maze operation became 
one of the first known Russian cyber operations and highlighted potential defensive 
vulnerabilities in America. Russia's capabilities began a dialogue, starting in the US, 
 
21 Madeline Carr. "Public–private partnerships in national cyber-security strategies." International 
Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): p. 43-62. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/INTA92_1_03_Carr.pdf 
22 Myriam Dunn-Cavelty and Manuel Suter, ‘Public–private partnerships are no silver bullet: an expanded 
governance model for critical infrastructure protection,’ International Journal of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 2: 4, 2009, p. 181-190 
23 Russian cyber programs have roots in the 1950s when cybernetic programs helped build Soviet machine 
communication projects as the foundation for future online capabilities. However, this study considers the 
1999 Moonlight Maze operation the first modern Russian OCO because it leveraged early IT networks to 
steal data from multiple organizations – attributes not present in older Soviet programs. See Slava 
Gerovitch’s From Newspeak to Cyberspeak. 
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about Moscow's ability to target critical infrastructure – helping to start monitoring 
programs in several public and private sectors.24   
 Since 1999, Russia gradually built an integrated approach to offensive cyber that 
focused on information dominance to degrade the adversary – a strategy well suited to 
manipulate fragmented policy approaches to cybersecurity. As Moscow's cyber 
capabilities evolved, OCO became a viable method for leveraging tactics that operate 
below the armed conflict level while still damaging adversarial infrastructure. By 2007, 
Russian offensive cyber tactics evolved from data theft to damaging critical 
infrastructure. Russia's DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack against Estonia in 
April and May of 2007 represented a concerted effort to take advantage of its 
interconnected online systems to slow communications and shutdown key financial 
institutions.25 Unlike the Moonlight Maze operation in 1999, Connell and Vogler note 
that the Estonia operation was a deliberate attack that fomented fear in the population and 
focused on taking advantage of a public-private system that valued online efficiency.26 
By 2015, Russian OCO against critical infrastructure evolved significantly, 
resulting in the first malware-based cyber-attack against another nation's electrical grid. 
The operation shut down Ukraine's power for over 220,000 people.27 In 2016, Russian 
cyber actors launched considerable efforts to target the US Presidential election. A 
prominent component was the hacking operations against US political parties aimed at 
disrupting the electoral process, according to the Office of the Director of National 
 
24 Shackelford et al. 322-30 
 
25 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler. “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare.” Center for Naval Analyses, 
March 2017. p. 13, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-014231-1Rev.pdf. 
26 Ibid, 13-16 
27 Ibid, 16-22 
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Intelligence.28 The 2016 cyber operations against America was part of a gradual Russian 
capability buildup designed to target a wide range of critical infrastructure and 
manipulate defensive vulnerabilities.29 
Russia's approach to the online domain highlights why OCO (Offensive Cyber 
Operations) is a vital part of its approach and enables manipulating critical infrastructure 
weaknesses. However, understanding Russian offensive cyber means distinguishing it 
from information warfare. During the 2016 US Presidential elections, the distinction was 
apparent when Russia used online disinformation and malicious hacking. Connell, 
Vogler, and Giles highlight that Russian offensive cyber is a subset of information 
warfare designed to enable more destructive tactics that degrades an adversary. Although 
Russian offensive cyber is related to information warfare strategically, it remains a 
separate function because it uses specific technical means.30,31 According to Giles and 
General Valery Gerasimov – Chief of the Russian General Staff – Russia's approach to 
information warfare traces back to the Soviet era and broadly includes asymmetric tactics 
like information operations, disinformation campaigns, and more recently, cyber-
attacks.32,33 Further Russian scholarship aligns with this view, indicating that information 
 
28 “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.” Intelligence Community 
Assessment. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 6, 2017. p. 1-3, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
29 ODNI, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” 2 
30 Connell and Vogler, 3 
31 Keir Giles. “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s 
Exercise of Power,” March 21, 2016. p. 9; 61-64 https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-new-
tools-confronting-west.  
32 Ibid, 11 
33 Gerasimov, 25 
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warfare, and the specialized destructive subcomponent of offensive cyber, focus on 
information dominance without force.34  
Russia's broad understanding of information warfare enables it to use damaging 
cyber capabilities more flexibly because Moscow considers cyberspace a component of 
the information space rather than a new domain.35,36 Gerasimov even notes that "the 
information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting 
potential of the enemy."37 Russia's flexibility is evident in a Kremlin strategy that focuses 
on the Armed Forces' operations in the information domain. The strategy highlights that 
cyberspace is part of the information space and linked with IT, software, or supporting 
infrastructure to enable offensive technical tactics – such as cyber-attacks.38 The ability to 
view cyberspace as an interconnected web of supporting pieces enables complex Russian 
cyber operations like those seen in 2016 that used offensive hacking tactics. Russia's 
approach works particularly well when a cyber-attack requires manipulating critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. It aligns with Moscow's view that cyber targets are a 
combination of virtual and physical components. Although Russian offensive cyber is a 
specialized subset of information warfare capabilities, destructive operations are 
becoming a high-tech enhancement for Russia's broader strategic approach to information 
 
34 Sergey Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov. ‘The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,’ Military 
Thought, No. 4, 2013., p. 16. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Nature-and-Content-of-a-New-
Generation-War-Chekinov-Bogdanov/c8874593b1860de12fa40dadcae8e96861de8ebd 
35 Connell and Vogler, 3-5  
36 Giles, 61-64 
37 Gerasimov, 26 
38 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Information Space,” p. 1-3 
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dominance. Destructive cyber operations remain connected to the information domain by 
sharing the goal of degrading the adversary with non-kinetic tactics.39,40,41 
Understanding Russian offensive cyber strategy is crucial because it highlights a 
desire to degrade adversarial control of the information space by manipulating defensive 
weaknesses, whether technical or policy-related. The context of Moscow's strategy is 
crucial when analyzing approaches that countries, such as the US, created for responding 
to state-sponsored cyber threats. The scholarship illustrates broad offensive tactics but 
does not highlight if Moscow's tactics create signatures that threat-informed surveillance 
can detect. Understanding this level of detail is vital when evaluating whether threat-
informed surveillance techniques – such as IT-OT monitoring – can mitigate Russian 
offensive cyber tactics. While Knapp, Langill, and DHS, broadly agree that IT-OT 
monitoring is promising because it can monitor all network layers and automatically 
detect intrusion traits, understanding specific Russian cyber behavior is crucial to 
corroborating efficacy against Moscow.42,43 
The Limitations of US Cybersecurity Reforms: Problems with Modern Policy 
 Throughout the 2000s, America created reforms that focused on sprawling 
government-led cybersecurity programs as lessons from Russia's efforts in the 1990s 
forced policymakers to realize cyberspace's growing vulnerabilities. These policies 
focused on protecting critical infrastructure from nations like Russia; however, the 
 
39 Connell and Vogler, 1-5; 27-29  
40 Giles, 1-10; 61-64 
41 Chekinov and Bogdanov, 14-16 
42 Knapp and Langill, 30-36; 50-53. 
43 DHS, “Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-
Depth Strategies,” 15-32 
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implementation created a confusing bureaucracy.44,45  Unfortunately, US cybersecurity 
reforms pushed firms to focus on costs and streamlining processes over cyber defenses 
because of the government's increasing requirements.  
For example, in the US energy industry, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) are the two-primary regulatory agencies 
for enforcing cybersecurity standards, according to 2003's PPD 7 and 2005's Energy 
Policy Act.46 These policies would suggest that the DOE and FERC oversee cyber 
defenses for the energy industry. However, regulatory agencies must also coordinate with 
DHS because it manages the NCCIC and responds to cyber incidents – unlike regulatory 
bodies that focus on standards enforcement. The divide between DHS and regulatory 
bodies means cybersecurity responsibilities belong to multiple agencies.47 Private firms 
must contend with several sets of compliance standards and coordinate with multiple 
federal cybersecurity agencies. 
 DHS attempted to improve private-public integration between 2009 and 2015 
with the NIPP (National Infrastructure Protection Plan), EINSTEIN 2, and EINSTEIN 3 
Accelerated – EINSTEIN 1 was a limited iteration that started in 2003.48 EINSTEIN 2 
began in 2009 and focused on a series of integrated sensors across federal infrastructure 
that monitored possible cyber intrusions. EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated expanded these 
 
44 “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks,” DHS, p. 1-5  
45 Parfomak et al. 4-9; 17-20 
46 Ibid 
47 “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks,” DHS, p. 1-5 
48 In 2012, DHS also established the Continuous Diagnostic Mitigation (CDM) program, which deployed a 
series of sensors and data integration dashboards across US civilian agencies to aide identity, network, and 
data management. However, CDM focuses on the .gov domain, which is why this study focuses on the 
EINSTEIN program that eventually expanded to private industry. See CDM Program Overview and 
appendix 1. 
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sensors to major private internet service providers in 2012, using classified information to 
detect large cyber threats signatures.49  
Table 1: NIPP Sector and Cross-Sector Coordinating Structures50 
Mirroring the definition of IT-OT monitoring because of its sensors across 
multiple networks, DHS notes that EINSTEIN provides defenders with the capability to 
stop an average of 5.4 million intrusions per year – each corresponding to signatures of 
known cyber threats.51 While the technical capabilities of this system are not in question, 
implementation faced resistance. Compatibility issues, cost, authority confusion, and 
 
49 “EINSTEIN | CISA.” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/einstein.  
50 “National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.” 
Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013. p. 10-11 
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/national-infrastructure-protection-plan-2013-508.pdf.  
51 “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks,” DHS, p. 1-3 
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recalcitrant civilian agencies made EINSTEIN problematic as it struggled to integrate 
across disparate networks. EINSTEIN is a reminder that cutting down coordination needs 
and streamlining implementation practices are highly impactful for adoption rates.52,53,54 
Initially, DHS focused on defending government systems; however, the 2013 
NIPP, the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, and the Cybersecurity Act of 
2015 allowed the department to respond to civilian incidents. These policy efforts 
expanded DHS authorities and attempted to build a collaborative structure with the 
private sector. Table 1 illustrates how the NIPP uses coordinating councils between 
industry and government to improve critical infrastructure defenses. The NIPP 
complemented executive order 13,636 in 2013, which created a new analytical 
cybersecurity framework from the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) – formalized into law in 2014 and updated in 2018. The new program focused on 
having participating organizations follow a series of guidelines, standards, and common 
cybersecurity practices to "identify, assess, and manage cyber risks."55 Although the 
NIST methodology mostly targeted government agencies and critical infrastructure 
providers, it represented a significant attempt at a standard approach to cybersecurity 
reporting for both public and private organizations in America.56,57 
Unfortunately, the civilian sector was still mostly responsible for defending itself. 
Even with increased authorities, DHS was in a more reactionary role because it could not 
 
52 Charlotte Clément-Cottuz. “Risks in Governmental Cybersecurity Program : Case Study of the Einstein 
Project | Journal of Strategic Threat Intelligence.” Journal of Strategic Threat Intelligence 1, no. 37 
(November 2017): 1–3. 
53 Dunn-Cavelty and Suter, 181-190 
54 Carr, 42-61 
55  “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, April 16, 2018. p. iv 
56 Ibid, iv 
57 Shackelford et al. 328-29 
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proactively intervene in civilian networks without a cyber incident occurring due to 
privacy regulations.58,59 Policies like the NIPP coordinating councils and the NIST 
framework helped with some of the legal restrictions by building private-public 
collaboration points and a standard approach to cyber-threat reporting. 60,61,62 However, 
government cybersecurity oversight continued to grow, and despite some policy 
successes, private-sector firms saw an increasing number of agencies and regulations. 
According to the Congressional Research Service and Etizoni, America's push to increase 
its public cybersecurity posture helped decrease coordination with the government to 
avoid added costs, perceived over-regulation, and privacy violations.63,64,65,66  
A critical technology trend that bolstered these problems was IT-OT convergence. 
The SANS Institute noted that IT and OT systems that were once separate are converging 
in critical infrastructure industries since at least the early 2000s. IT-OT convergence was 
born out of a desire to lower operational costs and maximize new automation technology 
to manage more OT with less IT.67 These technologies were separate because connecting 
IT and OT requires broad access. When critical infrastructure and OT components 
 
58 Chris Jaikaran. "DHS's Cybersecurity Mission – An Overview." CRS Report. Congressional Research 
Service, December 19, 2018. p. 1-2 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IF10683.pdf. 
59 “National Cyber Strategy.” Washington, DC: The White House, September 2018. P. 8-11 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.  
60 “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 1-11 
61 “NIPP: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” DHS, 1-20 
62 The 2018 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act established the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency as the primary coordinating body responsible for critical infrastructure 
defense. It also absorbed responsibility maintaining the NIPP and NIST framework. See Supporting Policy 
and Doctrine | CISA. 
63 Amitai Etzioni. “Cybersecurity in the Private Sector.” Issues in Science and Technology 28, no. 1 (2011): 
58–61. https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/43315569. 
64 Parfomak et al. 17-20 
65 Jaikaran, 1-2 
66 Parfomak et al. 1-10 
67 Harp and Gregory-Brown, 8-9 
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become remotely managed by IT, cyber actors have more attack vectors because of the 
increased connectivity.68 While cybersecurity has matured, the exponential number of 
available attack avenues makes it difficult for network defenders to patch all 
vulnerabilities.69 
   Unfortunately, IT-OT convergence's push for automation causes firms to focus 
on cost over security by relying on new technology that can seemingly manage more 
tasks with fewer resources, amplifying reform problems in the 2000s. A culture of 
efficiency and cost reduction magnifies perceived issues with government cybersecurity 
oversight, driving firms to decrease public partnerships to avoid added regulatory 
expenses. Etizoni and the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team highlight that many 
critical infrastructure firms attempt to hide cyber breaches or forgo advanced defense 
systems to prevent public exposure and lower profits while maintaining cost efficiencies 
from IT-OT convergence.70,71 The apprehension for more robust cybersecurity or 
cooperation with government entities comes from the fear that the new defenses or 
regulations will reduce network speeds, increase maintenance costs, and invite public 
criticism for invading privacy.72,73 Knapp and Langill note that these concerns recognize 
business needs; however, they do not consider the growing capabilities of state-supported 
cyber actors that take advantage of the networked IT-OT architecture.74 
 
68 “Heightened DDoS Threat Posed by Mirai and Other Botnets.” Technical Alert. Washington, DC: 
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, October 14, 2016. https://us-
cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-288A. 
69 Ibid, 4-5 
70 Etizoni, 58-61 
71 Parfomak et al. 17-20 
72 DHS, “Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-
Depth Strategies,” 29 
73 Knapp and Langill, 51-53. 
74 Ibid 
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As complicated cybersecurity reforms in the US progressed from 2003 to 2018, 
the trend of IT-OT convergence spread throughout private industry. Carr, Dunn-Cavelty, 
and Suter confirm that the US experience is not a localized example. Similar private-
public relationship issues appeared in nations, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia, 
that attempted government-led reforms. However, this study focuses on the US case 
because of greater data availability.75,76 Since the private sector is crucial for 
infrastructure management in America and other Western-aligned nations, uncooperative 
relationships with the government breeds weak cybersecurity practices that allow 
aggressive nations, such as Russia, to leverage its destructive cyber capabilities. 
Organizations with lackluster cybersecurity systems or standards benefit nations 
like Russia and give them flexibility when operating in cyberspace. Russia's focus on 
destructive technical methods to achieve information dominance and degrade an 
adversary's infrastructure incentivizes Moscow to manipulate political and technical 
weaknesses.77 A disaggregated policy approach to cyber defenses supports Russia's 
strategy because critical infrastructure providers are less likely to report cybersecurity 
problems or implement threat surveillance, such as IT-OT monitoring. Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand if Russian tactics exhibit observable behaviors that allow modern 
defensive techniques like IT-OT monitoring to intervene and build recommendations that 
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Adding Value: Identifying Gaps in Modern Scholarship  
One of the primary gaps in current research is the lack of nation-specific studies 
that confirm the effectiveness of modern cybersecurity techniques and recommendations 
that learn from adversarial strategy and past reform issues. DHS and cybersecurity 
scholars note that IT-OT monitoring is broadly effective against state-supported cyber 
actors because it can automatically create alerts or block suspected attacks when it detects 
intrusion behaviors. However, the analysis does not extend to specific adversaries like 
Russia.78,79,80  
Based on current research, it is unclear if major adversaries emit detectable cyber 
behaviors during a cyber intrusion that allow IT-OT monitoring to intervene. This study 
begins to fill these gaps by focusing on Russia because of Moscow's destructive view of 
OCO and increasingly aggressive attacks against critical infrastructure since 1999. The 
subsequent analysis will compare multiple offensive Russian cyber cases to determine if 
they illustrate observable signatures that IT-OT monitoring could detect, and thus, 
mitigate. Afterward, the study will build a policy strategy based on the comparative 
results to increase IT-OT monitoring's adoption while addressing the strained private-
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Methodology81 
Comparative Case Studies of Russian Cyber-Attacks 
As noted by DHS, threat-informed surveillance systems – such as IT-OT 
monitoring – rely on programable logic that learns observable intruder behaviors to create 
alerts or block attacks. Thus, for modern surveillance to function, the intruder needs to 
exhibit abnormal behavioral patterns outside the bounds of an authorized user that 
indicate malicious intentions. For example, forging email addresses to mimic known 
accounts, using credentials to create external server connections, or stealing logins to 
unnecessarily access sensitive data.82,83,84  
This study examines Russian cyber-attacks to determine if they create observable 
behaviors because these conditions allow IT-OT monitoring to function. The study 
examines the 2007 DDoS attack against Estonia's communication and financial systems, 
the 2015 malware attack against Ukraine's electrical grid, and the 2016 hacking of US 
political parties – case selection explained in greater detail below. By comparing these 
attacks, the study builds a set of common Russian tactics. It then identifies if these result 
in abnormal cyber behavioral traits – warning signs that threat-informed surveillance 
would detect and mitigate. The study then combines these results into a standard Russian 
cyber kill chain that represents Moscow's offensive approach to critical infrastructure to 
identify which parts of their operations are the most vulnerable to IT-OT monitoring. 
This study defines effective mitigation as stopping the cyber-attack, slowing the intrusion 
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down, or creating alerts before breaching a sensitive system. If observable behaviors are 
present, IT-OT monitoring will have the capability to alert network defenders or 
automatically block intruders – as previously defined by DHS. 
 The study's comparative case analysis across the three Russian cyber-attacks 
represent Moscow's switch to destructive measures against critical infrastructure – a 
departure from 1999. Each case is similar because the operations resulted in damage to 
critical infrastructure as defined in this analysis; this similarity enables comparisons. 
However, the attacks used different offensive techniques – diverse variables – which 
satisfies the requirements for comparative methods. The cases will examine how Russia 
infiltrated and attacked the target to identify common cyber TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures) and understand if these tactics have observable behaviors or signatures 
that allow IT-OT monitoring to intervene.  
The study's methodology tests how the independent variable – IT-OT monitoring 
– affects the dependent variable – the success rate of offensive Russian cyber TTPs 
against critical infrastructure. The success rate is a nation's ability, specifically Russia, to 
use an offensive cyber TTP to expand an intrusion or levy damaging effects consistent 
with the earlier definition of offensive cyber operations. The results drive policy 
recommendations to help the adoption of threat-informed surveillance while learning 
from American reform efforts in the 2000s. 
Case Selection Reasoning 
Since the attacks against Estonia, Ukraine, and America use different tactics, the 
study excluded the 2008 DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) operation against Georgia. 
Both the Estonian and Georgian cyber-attacks were DDoS-based, and Russia likely used 
20 
the OCO against Georgia to enhance conventional military operations immediately 
afterward. Timing cyber and military strikes together introduces the concept of hybrid 
war, which is out of scope for this study. The study's methodology focuses on defensive 
cybersecurity techniques and identifying observable Russian cyber warning signs.85  
It is also necessary to address the Ukraine case. Current scholarship indicates 
Russia maintained a significant degree of control over the Ukrainian cyber domain by 
2015, potentially suggesting a diminished comparative value of the malware induced 
blackout. Ukraine's reliance on Russian e-services, such as email, helped Russian cyber 
actors access Ukrainian communications and critical infrastructure.86 These 
circumstances make OCO easier, but they do not diminish the cyber-attack's 
methodological value. The TTPs involved remains significant because of the time, 
complexity, and scope of the operation. Despite Russia's control over Ukraine's 
cyberspace, the 2015 attack against the electrical grid remains the first known OCO that 
successfully induced a large-scale electrical failure. Excluding the 2008 Georgian 
operation and using the Ukraine attack enables a consistent application of comparative 
methods. Each case represents a significant cyber operation against critical infrastructure 
with unique tactics. 
Limitations on Sources 
The cases rely on scholarly research that describes Russian cyber-attack TTPs, 
trade association reports, or unclassified government documents highlighting Russian 
cyber activity and the intrusion behavioral traits. Primary sources originated from the 
SANS Institute, the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of 
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National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the Swedish Defense Research Agency, 
Estonia's NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, the Russian 
Presidential Executive Office, and the Russian Ministry of Defense. These sources 
include studies that had access to Russian malware. Unfortunately, the author's limited 
computer science knowledge prevented a quantitative approach that identifies coding 
signatures in Russian cyber-attacks. Additionally, the author cannot speak or read 
Russian and did not have access to a translator. These limitations made access to Russian 
sources impossible unless a translation existed – translation software is unreliable with 
the Russian language. 
Furthermore, the author only accessed technical information regarding Russian 
cyber-attacks available to the public – restricting the kinds of case studies and type of 
analysis conducted. The data restriction requires the study to use past case studies to 
determine if Russian TTPs create conditions that generate observable traits for effective 
IT-OT monitoring – current threat data remains limited. Data limitations also restricted 
this study's capability to examine reforms during the 2000s in other Western-aligned 
nations. Upon reviewing existing literature, studies with broader comparative cases 
across multiple countries used methodologies that relied on custom interviews of in-
country personnel and special agreements to review policy documents not easily 
accessible by the public. Current restrictions on travel and in-person meetings make a 
multi-country investigation infeasible, which is why the lessons-learned focus on the US 




Data: Case Studies on Russian Cyber-Attacks 
2007 Operation Against Estonia: Trigger Point (April 2007) 
 On April 26, 2007, Estonia's Government moved a statue that honored Soviet 
World War Two soldiers from the central square in Tallinn, the capital, to the city 
outskirts. Russia protested this act and called for the resignation of Estonia's parliament. 
Moscow later unleashed DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks against Estonian 
networks to halt internet communications, financial transactions, and government 
services. These cyber-attacks caused extensive stoppages in critical infrastructure.87,88 
Estonia is one of the most internet-dependent countries because it relies on a national 
digital ID program and a country-wide data-sharing layer called X-Road to increase 
interoperability between businesses and government. Over 2,300 public and private 
services use X-Road, and nearly 100% of Estonian citizens enroll in the digital ID 
program to access e-services, making internet disruptions highly debilitating.89   
Understanding a DDoS Attack 
A DDoS attack relies on flooding the target with network traffic. The increased 
information flow disrupts legitimate server usage, preventing users from accessing the 
target service or system. One way to conduct this kind of attack is through a botnet, 
which Russia used against Estonia. Botnets are a linked web of computers infected by 
malware, typically between 3,000 and 10,000, controlled by a hacker to overload a target 
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with network traffic. The exponential amount of activity uses the victim's bandwidth 
capacity, causing services to stop.90,91  
Two DDoS Waves (April 2007 – May/June 2007) 
By April 28, the first wave of attacks began targeting the "Estonian Government 
Briefing Room, the Estonian Ministry of Defense, and leading political parties in the 
country."92 The initial wave had minimal impact because it was mostly unorganized 
Russian hackers from Russian. However, on May 8 and 9, Russian cyber actors 
unleashed the second DDoS wave that hit vital parts of Estonia's critical infrastructure. 
Estonia's parliament, two of its largest banks, nearly every government ministry, and six 
of the largest news organizations were all overloaded by botnet traffic.93,94 The attack 
used about 1 million computers, and the traffic volume reached 100 megabytes per 
second at its peak. According to the US-CERT, although the attack's scale is alarming, it 
is not overly complicated.95 The rental cost for a typical botnet with 3,000 to 10,000 
computers on the black market is approximately $1,000 to $5,000, making the cost of the 
Estonia attack roughly $500,000. Furthermore, at the time, the largest DDoS attack 
measured 40 gigabytes per second at its peak – one gigabyte is equal to 1,000 megabytes. 
For a nation with Russia's capabilities, the 2007 DDoS against Estonia is quite 
achievable.96,97 
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 However, the cyber-attack's targeted nature highlights several other dangers 
because Russia was able to identify the necessary parts of critical infrastructure to force a 
full internet shut down that impacted over 60% of the country.98,99 Since Estonia is a 
small nation, the DDoS network traffic overloaded its servers, forcing it to stop outside 
internet connections. Larger nations like the US would likely absorb an attack the size of 
the 2007 operation. If Russia had targeted only one sector, such as financial services, 
Estonia would probably not have used drastic measures. Since Moscow systematically 
targeted key pillars of critical infrastructure responsible for daily operations – public 
services, communications, and the economy – Estonia had few courses of action other 
than to isolate itself from the outside world.100  
Implications of the Operation 
Estonia remains highly reliant on online infrastructure to run the nation, and 
before the 2007 attack, the country claimed it was a "paperless government."101 The 
DDoS attacks resulted in damages worth at least several millions of dollars – although the 
total loss is unknown.102,103 However, the danger of the attacks was Russia's ability to 
disrupt several Estonian society pillars systematically. Russian cyber actors also gained 
access to data on several critical infrastructure sectors. The information's value was its 
ability to enhance future offensive cyber operations against similar critical 
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infrastructure.104,105,106 The 2007 DDoS attacks resulted in a cyber blockade that isolated 
Estonia and was one of the first known offensive Russian cyber operations that damaged 
an adversary's critical infrastructure. 
Key Russian OCO TTPs in Estonia and IT-OT Monitoring 
Figure 2 illustrates the cyber kill chain for the DDoS attack against Estonia, and it 
reveals two broad tactics – target surveillance and attack vector deployment. In Estonia, 
most financial, government, and news services were online at the time, making it simple 
for an informed cyber actor to understand the crucial organizations responsible for the 
country's daily operations. Since several firms and government organizations managed 
their services through websites, the attackers used this to locate unsecured public IP 
(Internet Protocol) addresses to disrupt the website servers with the botnet.107  
Figure 2: Estonia Cyber Kill Chain and IT-OT Monitoring Intervention Points 
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If the victim does not secure technical identifying information, such as an IP 
address, it becomes a vulnerability. A cyber actor can use the data to target website server 
architecture and deploy the desired attack vector. In Estonia, Russia leveraged the botnet 
to exponentially increase network traffic to several web servers, preventing legitimate 
users from using multiple vital online services.108 When the botnet surges traffic, this 
action exhibits distinguishing and detectable traits during the delivery or action on 
objectives stage in the kill chain. The increased network activity and bandwidth drops 
result in measurable data consumption that surveillance systems, such as IT-OT 
monitoring, can detect if configured to observe external connection points. Detecting and 
recognizing increased traffic and extensive bandwidth usage is crucial for future 
mitigation. 
2015 Operation Against Ukraine 
 Russia's offensive cyber operations against Ukraine's electrical grid remains one 
of the most significant cyber-attacks because it is the first known case where cyber actors 
shut down power for over 220,000 people.109 Unlike the 2007 DDoS against Estonia, the 
2015 operation was a concerted effort to breach internal systems and compromise critical 
infrastructure. The operation was likely in response to several events. These included 
Ukrainian legislation that would nationalize private utility firms with connections to 
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Russian oligarchs and pro-Ukrainian activist attacks on Russian controlled substations in 
Crimea.110  
Understanding Spear-Phishing and Malware in Ukraine 
 Spear-phishing was the delivery method that Russian cyber actors used to insert 
malware into Ukraine's electricity providers. When an attacker uses spear-phishing, they 
purposely deceive the victim, usually over email, to willingly give up sensitive 
information – passwords are the most common target. However, the attacker can also use 
this vector to deliver malicious programs – malware – making email a popular 
distribution method.111 In most cases, the malware hides in an attachment, and this is 
what occurred in Ukraine. The attackers created custom spear-phishing emails that 
tricked users into opening the message, allowing malware to offload itself into the 
network.112,113 
 The primary malware programs involved were Black Energy 3 (BE3) and Kill 
Disk. The BE3 malware mostly focused on harvesting credentials and establishing 
connections to external server points controlled by Russia. Increased access allowed the 
attackers to move more freely through the Ukrainian networks. Kill Disk was part of the 
final stages by allowing the cyber actors to erase files and damage applications used to 
manage operational technology like circuit breakers.114,115 
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Attack Set up (July 2015 – December 2015) 
 Although the Ukraine cyber-attack occurred on December 23, 2015, the operation 
took at least six months to prepare. Russian attackers penetrated multiple Ukrainian 
utility firms using spear-phishing.116 The total number of spear-phishing emails sent 
remains unclear, but it is likely between 50 and 100 because the subsequent malware 
attacks impacted at least 50 electrical substations.117,118,119 Russian cyber actors used 
spear-phishing to deliver the Black Energy 3 malware to multiple utility providers and 
used stolen credentials for several months to probe the corporate network for 
weaknesses.120,121 The cyber actors initially entered through the corporate IT network; 
however, as they obtained legitimate credentials, they manipulated the connections 
between the various network layers to move from the corporate side to sensitive OT 
sections – see figure 3.122,123 These areas were the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) 
networks that governed HMIs (Human Machine Interfaces) – often physical workstations 
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Figure 3 – Ukraine Attack Progression124 
 
Attack Execution (December 2015) 
The affected HMIs were part of a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) environment to manage physical processes. SCADA systems often connect to 
a broader ICS network that leverages IT to automate OT processes like electrical power 
management. Once in the ICS networks, the attackers deployed the Kill Disk malware to 
erase files in the SCADA environment, interrupt several electrical processes, and then 
manipulate the circuit breakers to cause the blackout.125,126,127 The blackout impacted 
three regions, including Kyiv, Prykarpattia, and Chernivtsi. The grid for these regions 
serves at least 3 million people. Comparatively, 220,000 people losing power is low. 
However, this attack's danger comes from its targeted and coordinated nature rather than 
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the size of the affected population. The cyber actors demonstrated precise knowledge of 
ICS-SCADA systems, and their ability to target specific substations highlights the 
dangerous sophistication and accuracy of this attack. Furthermore, although the blackout 
impacted a comparatively small number of people, the grid lost over 130 Megawatts 
(MW) of power in six hours – the grid's projected daily output is between 400 and 520 
MW. The estimated financial loss for an attack of this scale is up to $6 billion, making 
the Ukraine attack costly in both money and power.128,129,130,131  
Implications of the Ukraine Operation 
Unlike the Estonia attack, where the country responded by shutting down external 
internet connections, Ukraine faced difficulty organizing a timely response to limit the 
damaging blackout. By the time Russian cyber actors were able to deploy the final 
malware, the Ukrainian utility firms were already severely compromised. Although 
Ukrainian firms and government response teams eventually expelled the Russian cyber 
actors and hardened existing network defenses with NATO support, Moscow already 
achieved its goals.132 The 2015 cyber-attack represented a significant escalation of 
Russia's cyber capabilities. The Russian OCO against Ukraine demonstrated Moscow's 
capability to manipulate linked IT architecture to create highly destructive effects.133 
Russia's OCO against Ukraine highlights how the interconnection from IT-OT 
convergence can become a critical weakness. Russian cyber actors used the layered 
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connections between the less secure Ukrainian corporate network and sensitive ICS 
against utility providers. By covertly acquiring access credentials and manipulating 
connector points, defenders had little warning of the attack. These lessons underscore the 
need for IT-OT monitoring that surveils all networks for abnormal cyber behavior.  
Key Russian OCO TTPs in Ukraine and IT-OT Monitoring 
 The Russian cyber-attack against Ukraine's electrical grid highlights several 
critical TTPs. The attack relies on first building accesses. In Ukraine, this happened 
through email-based spear-phishing that delivered the initial malware payload, BE3. The 
next TTP was network surveillance. Although this tactic has similarities with Russia's 
attack against Estonia in 2007, the cyber actors conducted internal surveillance through 
stolen access credentials in Ukraine. In 2007, cyber actors conducted external network 
surveillance to identify unsecured public information. The use of legitimate credentials 
enabled Russia to find connection points into the ICS network and deploy their attack 
vector – the final major TTP. The attackers deployed the Kill Disk malware into several 
operational technology processes to disrupt services and enable the blackout's conditions.  
The 2015 offensive cyber operation against Ukraine's electrical grid reveals a 
sophisticated and well-planned methodology focused on clandestine accesses. However, 
like Estonia, Russia's tactics create observable traits that systems, such as IT-OT 
monitoring, can detect. Figure 3 aggregates the Ukraine operation data to present a cyber 
kill chain that also displays IT-OT monitoring intervention points.  
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Figure 3: Ukraine Cyber Kill Chain and IT-OT Monitoring Intervention Points 
 
The initial access building through spear-phishing and subsequent surveillance using 
stolen credentials are the most likely points where surveillance systems can detect an 
intrusion. Spear-phishing is a popular tactic with other state-supported cyber actors and 
criminal groups, making behavioral markers, such as forged emails, odd grammar, or 
hidden links, well-known and measurable by threat-informed surveillance.134 
Likewise, unauthorized users using stolen credentials will likely deviate from an 
authorized user's behavioral patterns to connect with other networks. In Ukraine, BE3 
allowed the attackers to steal users' credentials that would not usually have access to the 
ICS networks and establish an external server connection. These deviate well outside 
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average user norms because it requires accessing sensitive information constrained to a 
select group and creating a connection that links to servers outside the corporate network. 
When two servers communicate, they need to send data to each other, and this is where 
surveillance can detect external communication. A properly-configured IT-OT 
monitoring system would detect these behaviors because of the unnecessary attempts to 
access sensitive data and external connection points. Unfortunately, monitoring 
technology is unlikely to stop the attack if a cyber actor enters the ICS network. 
Therefore, it is crucial for surveillance systems to examine all entry points – internal and 
external – to create a more alert point. Detecting spear-phishing or the misuse of 
credentials over IT and OT networks is essential for preventing future Russian OCO. 
2016 Hacking and Dumping Operation Against the US 
 In contrast to Russia's 2007 and 2015 cyber-attacks, the 2016 hack and dump 
operation did not have a particular triggering event. The Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) indicates that the cause was likely a combination of events. 
These include Russia's preference for President Trump, a longstanding view that the US-
led liberal world order is a threat to the Putin regime, and even the Olympic doping 
scandal.135 The ODNI claims that the Russian hack and dump operation was part of a 
broader effort to influence the 2016 elections, including Russian propaganda and online 
information operations – though there is no evidence of tampering with voting 
architecture.136  
The study focuses on the hack and dump operation because it used intentional 
destructive methods to compromise private networks, which aligns with the earlier 
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definition of Offensive Cyber Operation. However, the study acknowledges the 
significance of concurrent online information operations that benefited from these 
hacks.137 Although Russia's hacking operations did not result in visible damage, the hack 
and dump activities directly attacked the US political process.138 The operation's 
intentions and tactics highlight Moscow's desire to disrupt American processes vital to 
the nation's successful operation. 
Attack Set-Up (March 2016) 
 According to the US Department of Justice, Russian cyber units associated with 
the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) purposely breached email 
accounts in the Clinton Campaign, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
(DCCC), and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to steal confidential 
documents.139 The cyber actors implanted several kinds of malware that allowed them to 
exfiltrate the data. Russia leaked the stolen documents to the public using online personas 
and the WikiLeaks organization – hence the term hack and dump.140 Russian cyber actors 
started the operation months before the onset of the 2016 US Presidential election. By 
March 2016, Russia dispatched 90 spear-phishing emails to various levels of the Clinton 
campaign. The targets ranged from junior staffers to the campaign's chairperson, John 
Podesta.141 Both official emails with at hillaryclinton.com addresses and google accounts 
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were subject to the operation's spear-phishing, which allowed Russian cyber actors to 
access multiple accounts at numerous levels – including John Podesta.142 
Understanding the Types of Malware 
Unlike Estonia and Ukraine, the 2016 US hacking operations saw a significant 
increase in malware volume. The Ukraine case highlighted two major malware programs, 
while the US exhibited four. Furthermore, unlike the Kill Disk program, which required 
manual control by the attacker, the malware used against the US was mostly automated. 
Like BE3, Mimikatz aided credential theft. Attackers then installed X-Agent to secure 
control over the victim, as it logs keystrokes and takes screenshots. X-Tunnel enabled a 
secure connection between the victim and external GRU-controlled computers. Finally, 
Rar.exe compressed documents for mass exfiltration. These malware programs represent 
increased sophistication and improved efficiency over the Ukraine operation only one 
year before.143,144,145  
Access Propagation and Data Exfiltration (April 2016) 
 By April 2016, Russia gained access to the Clinton campaign and DCCC through 
its spear-phishing. Russia also used a DNC employee's Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
connection to access their mail servers.146 A VPN enables individuals to access a private 
network remotely through existing internet connections. It is not clear how Russia gained 
access to the VPN, but it was likely unsecured, or the user had poor security hygiene – 
weak passwords, for example. Attackers then used Mimikatz, X-Agent, X-Tunnel, and 
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Rar.exe to enable data exfiltration. The cyber actors stole over 300 gigabytes of election-
related data.147  
Public Exposure (April 2016 – November 2016) 
Between late April and June, the GRU publicly posted thousands of documents 
through two online personas, DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0. By July, the Guccifer persona 
transferred document archives to the infamous disclosure group, WikiLeaks.148 On July 
22, 2016, three days before the Democratic National Convention, "WikiLeaks released 
over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC computer networks."149 
These leaks continued until the day before the 2016 election. Between October and 
November, WikiLeaks leaked more than 50,000 documents from John Podesta's email – 
including private speeches made by Hillary Clinton.150 According to Federal Election 
Commission campaign finance data, between 2016 and 2017, the DNC spent over 
$500,000 on technology services with Crowdstrike – a cybersecurity firm known for 
exposing Russian cyber efforts in 2016. The payments began in May 2016, shortly after 
GRU cyber actors exfiltrated data in April. The timeline suggests the payments were for 
mitigation efforts surrounding the Russian hacks; however, this does not include other 
organizations involved in remediation, such as law firms. The attack's total cost for the 
DNC likely reaches over $1 million.151,152 
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Russia's intentions were harmful and purposely designed to disturb the core 
political process fundamental to any republic, the democratic election of a new leader. 
The hack and dump OCO against the Democratic Party used destructive technical means 
to breach private networks, steal thousands of documents, and then leak the material. 
These acts almost certainly focused on tainting US political institution legitimacy, 
making it one of the most significant Russian cyber-attacks. 
Key Russian OCO TTPs in the US and IT-OT Monitoring 
 The 2016 Russian hack and dump operation against the US reveals TTPs that 
have some similarities with the 2015 cyber-attack against Ukraine – though there are 
differences in the tactics' execution. Like the Ukraine case, Russia started by building 
accesses through spear-phishing. This popular tactic remains effective because even with 
good user awareness or phishing detection systems, it is challenging to eliminate human 
error. The next major TTP is network surveillance, which also occurred in Ukraine. 
However, in the US, this step complimented the attack vector deployment. Unlike the 
Ukraine attack, the cyber actors had to traverse fewer security layers in 2016 because 
they were not breaking into sensitive ICS networks. Furthermore, because the hack and 
dump intrusions focused on stealing data, the malware involved did not create destructive 
effects. Instead, the programs mostly focused on locating and exfiltrating the victim's 
information. In contrast to past operations, Russia focused on public exposure to achieve 
its end-state in the US, and this TTP is not exclusively cyber-based. Russia used online 
platforms and personas to disseminate private information, but this is not reliant on a 
specific cyber technique.  
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Figure 4: US Cyber Kill Chain and IT-OT Monitoring Intervention Points 
Although Russia's destructive phase differs from previous cyber-attacks, 
preventative lessons remain consistent with other operations. Situational awareness and 
early detection are the primary mitigation takeaways in the US case because stopping 
cyber actors when they try to establish accesses or conduct extensive surveillance can 
halt the operation. Figure 4 illustrates the US attack's cyber kill chain and the intervention 
points for IT-OT monitoring. Like Russia's Ukraine operation, IT-OT monitoring systems 
have a high probability of intervention and mitigation if they focus on detecting spear-
phishing attempts, the misuse of credentials, or external connections. Spear-phishing has 
several observable traits already discussed, and compromised users obtained sensitive 
data – such as private speeches – they would not typically be able to access. 
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Furthermore, attackers also created several external connections to non-DNC or 
DCCC servers through X-Agent and X-Tunnel, creating a detectable communication 
signature because of data exchange between US and GRU-controlled servers. These 
tactics have measurable traits that present opportunities for defenders to discover before 
an attacker can exfiltrate the target data or deploy malware – stages where surveillance 
would do little to prevent further damage. While the 2016 hack and dump operation 
against the US Democratic Party is a unique OCO targeting non-traditional critical 
infrastructure, it still highlights vital lessons for defenders. 
Discussion: Comparing Case Study Data 
Common Russian Offensive Cyber TTPs  
Table 3 combines the study's findings across each case and illustrates several 
trends. Three common TTPs appear, include building accesses, target surveillance, and 
attack vector deployment. However, the data revealed that each TTP used unique 
methods of accomplishment specific to the operation. When analyzing each of the tactics, 
it is critical to consider the various methods used in their corresponding cases.  
Common Russian Offensive Cyber Behavioral Traits 
Most importantly, Table 3 illustrates that Russia's tactics did create observable 
behavioral traits that IT-OT monitoring could detect in over half of the tactics. Broadly, 
these focused on three behaviors – analyzed in greater detail below. First, building access 
through spear-phishing was one of the most common TTPs. Spear-phishing often requires 
fake addresses to mimic known emails, like a Gmail password reset, to trick users. Most 
threat-informed surveillance systems can detect because they contain databases of known 
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email types. Additionally, spear-phishing often uses malicious links embedded in the 
email, and these web addresses are observable – see figure 5.  
Figure 5: Example Russian Spear-Phishing Email153 
 
Second, Russian cyber actors favored conducting target surveillance through 
stolen credentials. These tactics require deviating outside the victim's regular operating 
routines. In several cases, the login information led to unnecessarily accessing sensitive 
information and creating external connections to unsecured servers – all apparent 
behavioral traits that indicate an intruder. Finally, when Russian attackers deployed a 
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack, the volume-based attack leaves a significant 
data signature because of increased data consumption as bandwidth drops. According to 
DHS, Knapp, and Langill, IT-OT monitoring would detect these behaviors because the 
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systems use a library of open source and private data to create cyber-attack profiles, 
enabling the automatic detection when activity deviates outside user norms.154,155,156 
Table 3 also highlights a critical caveat. Although Russian OCO tactics created 
observable behaviors in over half of the cases, almost all correspond to set-up phases, 
indicating that IT-OT monitoring is mostly a preventative measure. Unfortunately, if an 
attacker can set up their attack, threat-informed surveillance would do little to stop the 
operation. Even if an attack vector, like malware, produced signatures, IT-OT monitoring 
would not stop the cyber-attack because the intruder already breached the target system. 
While the case studies reveal that Russian TTPs create several abnormal behavioral traits 
during an attack's initial phases, defenders still need to secure sensitive systems with 
active defenses.  
Case Findings: Attack Vector Deployment Through DDoS (Estonia, 2007) 
 
 The DDoS attack vector was the only TTP used in the latter half of a Russian 
offensive cyber operation where IT-OT monitoring could be an effective mitigation tool. 
In Estonia's case, many organizations observed large increases in bandwidth 
consumption, likely from the external botnet connections. The increased data 
consumption is a measurable trait that a monitoring system could detect to alert network 
defenders of a possible imminent attack, giving the victim vital time to isolate web 
servers or shut down connections in an emergency. IT-OT monitoring can surveil 
external connection points and look for signs of volume-based attacks, such as large 
bandwidth consumption, to prevent a DDoS. 
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Not effective
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impact on mitigation because the 
attack is already in its final stage 
and the damage is done
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masked its signatures
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would not be able to 
preemptively detect this
Not effective
If a cyber actor can exfiltrate data 
outside the victim’s network, 
surveillance will not be able to 
mitigate forms of unauthorized 
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Case Findings: Building Accesses with Spear-phishing (Ukraine, 2015; US, 2016) 
IT-OT monitoring systems would be effective against attackers trying to build 
access points through spear-phishing, as seen in Ukraine and America. Warnings like 
spelling mistakes or a forged email address designed to mimic a known account are 
learnable behaviors that modern defense systems can identify – though user education is 
still essential because technology can make mistakes. Additionally, when spear-phishing 
attempts do not have all the identifying attributes, mitigation systems can still isolate 
these incidents for further review by network defenders to prevent potential damage.157,158  
Even if spear-phishing is successful, IT-OT monitoring can detect and stop an 
intrusion after the initial penetration because it uses multi-layered surveillance. Many 
holistic surveillance systems encompass several access points that could alert network 
defenders before the attacker reaches sensitive components – especially if the cyber actor 
exhibits abnormal behaviors, such as excessive attempts to access restricted areas.159,160 
Though early detection remains critical because the longer an intruder remains on the 
network, they will be more likely to avoid defensive monitoring.  
Case Findings: Surveillance with Stolen Credentials (Ukraine, 2015; US, 2016) 
 A common tactic in Ukraine and American cases were stealing real login 
information. However, the use of these credentials' centers around a user's behavioral 
norms. When a user acquires sensitive information, and their position does not require the 
restricted data, this is a potential intrusion warning sign. Unnecessary accesses occurred 
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in Ukraine and the US, and this abnormal behavior is a trait IT-OT monitoring can 
identify because it highlights malicious intent. Furthermore, Russia used these credentials 
in Ukraine and America to set up external connections for a C2 channel to control the 
attacker. The external connection creates an observable signature IT-OT monitoring 
could detect because of data exchanged between the victim and attackers' servers. 
Overall Results from Comparative Analysis 
 The results of the comparative analysis indicate several crucial lessons. Broadly, a 
Russian OCO's (Offensive Cyber Operation) anatomy against critical infrastructure 
contains three phases – building accesses, target surveillance, and attack vector 
deployment. These TTPs result in several observable behavioral traits that IT-OT 
monitoring can detect, enabling surveillance to mitigate the attack if it intervenes during 
the delivery, exploitation, installation stages. The results highlight that Russian OCO 
against critical infrastructure is most vulnerable when the cyber actors set up the 
operation because they exhibit the abnormal behavior that telegraphs malicious intent – 
actions that deviate outside what authorized users would conduct. Unfortunately, because 
of the diverse tactics and tools available to Russian cyber actors, there is no standard IT-
OT monitoring version that applies to all critical infrastructure. Organizations will require 
relevant intelligence to configure threat-informed surveillance based on the risks they 
face in their industries. Figure 5 summarizes Moscow's tools, techniques, and procedures 
over the three case studies into a standard Russian cyber kill chain for OCO against 
critical infrastructure while highlighting where IT-OT monitoring can intervene.  
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Figure 6: Russian Cyber Kill Chain 
Implications of Findings in the Context of America's Reforms During the 2000s 
These results indicate cyber warning signs that modern threat-informed 
surveillance could detect; however, the results point to a broader policy issue. Countries 
like the US were tracking the Russian cyber threat since at least 1999, and the 2000s 
demonstrated an effort to combat this problem. Unfortunately, these efforts – combined 
with IT-OT convergence trends – created an environment where private sector 
infrastructure providers do not prioritize working with the government because they 
perceive the coordination costs as undesirable. The broader policy question is 
understanding how to create policies that support the broad adoption of IT-OT 
monitoring while learning from past problems to incentivize better private-public 
46 
cooperation. Building a better relationship between the public and private sectors is 
crucial to improving cybersecurity against nations like Russia.  
Policy Recommendation: Improving Private and Public Sectors Relationships 
A vital lesson from analyzing Russian tactics, and the problems observed in the 
US's efforts to reform cybersecurity during the 2000s, is simplified coordination. A 
strained private-public cybersecurity relationship benefits Moscow by giving them more 
opportunities for infiltration. The US reforms highlighted disjointed cybersecurity and 
regulatory processes that contribute to decreased private sector coordination. Streamlined 
government authorities are the first step to improving private-public relations. Currently, 
DHS works with several regulatory agencies, such as the DOE and FERC, and a complex 
coordinating council system from the NIPP. The US approach requires private industry to 
work with different agencies while separating cybersecurity and regulatory authorities in 
the government. If DHS, or organizations like it, had the authority to conduct regulation 
enforcement, it would grant cyber response teams more access to private critical 
infrastructure providers without the pretext of a breach. These authorities are mostly 
under regulatory agencies' that focus on standards enforcement.  
DHS could then proactively help infrastructure organizations to build defenses 
that are compliant with current standards before cyber-attacks occur. Most importantly, 
by centralizing regulation and cybersecurity authorities within the homeland security 
apparatus, private-public collaboration would be more straightforward. This approach 
empowers private industry to increase communication with cyber defense agencies 
because there is a central agency responsible for cybersecurity.161 Streamlining the 
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government structure is crucial because it is one of the main problems contributing to a 
contentious culture between private and public organizations. Although this suggestion 
comes from US lessons, other nations with similar government cybersecurity policies 
could use it. 
 Comparative analysis between Estonia, Ukraine, and the US revealed that 
Russian TTPs have several distinct signatures and abnormal behaviors that can alert IT-
OT monitoring systems of a possible intrusion. The critical lesson is ensuring that 
infrastructure providers have current intelligence telling them the warning signs and can 
easily communicate with government agencies when a breach happens. Governments 
could adopt a program like Israel's Cyber Net, an online platform where private industry 
can share breach data with cybersecurity agencies and other firms anonymously. The 
anonymity allows firms to share data without fear of public exposure, a concern that 
previously stopped private organizations from disclosing breaches. The communication 
channel also allows governments to share intelligence quickly, giving firms critical 
information on adversarial warning signs for threat-informed surveillance.162 
Furthermore, because other companies can access the data, it would pressure firms that 
do not prioritize network defense to realign IT priorities after seeing the damage caused 
by breaches. Information sharing programs help change the private-sector culture, 
improve coordination with the government, and ensure that infrastructure providers have 
the most accurate intelligence to feed IT-OT monitoring systems. 
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The comparative analysis revealed that Russian cyber actors could manipulate 
converging IT and OT systems because of the interconnection between networks to 
deliver an attack. The IT-OT convergence trend was also a factor contributing to cultural 
tensions between private and public organizations during American reform efforts in the 
2000s, demonstrating the need to broaden access to defensive techniques, like IT-OT 
monitoring, which can surveil all types of systems. Government financial aid can help the 
private sector lower cybersecurity costs to prevent attackers from taking advantage of IT-
OT connectivity. Grant programs and tax credits could help critical infrastructure 
providers afford commercial cybersecurity services to raise the industry's overall 
defensive capabilities, giving firms the tools to defend themselves. Focusing on giving 
companies resources also improves the private-public cybersecurity relationship by 
supporting industry rather than creating more government bureaucracy. 
While commercial cybersecurity firms, such as McAfee, have IT-OT monitoring 
capabilities, they require significant customization for critical infrastructure. The 
requirements of a bank are different from a utility firm. Infrastructure providers that 
purchase these services may also need to coordinate with government agencies to ensure 
that the system meets regulatory standards. Purchasing commercial solutions is different 
from a complete IT-OT monitoring system. Supportive funding aimed at giving firms the 
resources to build strong cybersecurity will help proliferate threat-informed surveillance 
that can decrease the number of vulnerabilities caused by IT-OT convergence.163 
Although Russian cyber-attacks have several warning signs that IT-OT 
monitoring can detect, a stronger private-public collaboration culture is necessary to 
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ensure threat-informed surveillance is broadly adopted. The American reform efforts in 
the 2000s show a convoluted government-led approach to defending critical 
infrastructure. These experiences, and new technology trends, did not foster a strong 
cybersecurity culture in private infrastructure providers. Therefore, the government 
should build collaborative policies that support private organizations rather than creating 
mandates or overbearing government agencies. A cooperative balance between public 
and private organizations is vital for creating a culture that values stopping state-
sponsored cyber-attacks. Defensive techniques like IT-OT monitoring can be effective 
against Russian cyber-attacks. Policymakers need to build flexible policies that support 
private industry and increase threat-informed surveillance's broad adoption. By focusing 
on providing streamlined processes, information sharing, and funding, threat-informed 
surveillance can be more efficient by operating in a collaborative private-public culture. 
Conclusion: A Partial Solution to the Russian Cyber Threat 
 Russia's offensive cyber capabilities against critical infrastructure evolved 
significantly since 1999. Russian OCO tactics broadly focus on building accesses through 
spear-phishing, conducting target surveillance with stolen credentials, and using several 
types of custom malware, or a DDoS, to deploy their attack vectors. In over half of the 
observed tactics, these created observable abnormal behavioral traits that an IT-OT 
monitoring system can detect. The detectable characteristics highlight that threat 
informed surveillance would likely be an effective measure to mitigate Russian offensive 
cyber. However, the results highlighted that the technique could only stop the intrusion or 
alert network defenders during set up phases. This outcome was critical because the 
comparative analysis revealed that IT-OT monitoring is mostly a preventative measure. 
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Threat-informed surveillance cannot replace active defenses, such as extra firewalls or 
network vulnerability inspections. Passive surveillance systems should be part of a 
broader defensive solution against the Russian cyber threat.  
 These results supported recommendations that would help broaden the adoption 
of IT-OT monitoring by addressing broader policy issues identified during attempted US 
reforms in the 2000s. Russian strategy highlights that it thrives in a scenario where 
adversary disorganization creates uneven cybersecurity capabilities. It gives Moscow the 
capability to control the information space and levy destructive offensive cyber to 
degrade the enemy. Unfortunately, the problems in the 2000s supported Russia's 
approach. The reforms and converging IT and OT systems created a private sector culture 
that valued cost reduction and efficiency. Automation in IT and OT amplified a strained 
private-public relationship with the government because firms needed to coordinate with 
several agencies.  
 The policy recommendations call for governments to streamline their regulatory 
and cybersecurity agencies. Homeland security organizations, such as DHS, need 
regulatory authorities to decrease critical infrastructure providers' coordination costs. The 
suggested reforms also support more intelligence sharing processes because it gives 
industry the necessary information to identify Russian behavioral markers. Finally, 
monetary support to purchase commercial solutions would help spread IT-OT monitoring 
and prevent Russian cyber actors from manipulating networked architecture. 
 As policymakers face more aggressive and destructive Russian cyber capabilities, 
it is vital to create methods that combat Moscow's offensive cyber approach. Focusing on 
creating a collaborative private-public relationship is one of the first steps. Instead of 
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forcing a government-driven solution, giving industries the necessary tools while 
streamlining private-public coordination points is a more productive pathway.  
Suggestions for Future Work 
 Understanding how to defend critical infrastructure from offensive Russian cyber 
operations is a complex topic. The study shows that although Russia telegraphs several 
observable abnormal cyber behaviors, the private-sector is reticent to adopt IT-OT 
monitoring. The policy recommendations provide suggestions for governments on how to 
fix cultural problems impeding threat-informed surveillance's standardization. However, 
investigation beyond this study would improve scholarship by understanding the specific 
reasons firms resist modernization. 
While lessons from the 2000s suggest possible reasons for low adoption rates of 
modern threat-informed surveillance, more detailed analysis is necessary. Identifying the 
cybersecurity systems currently in use and the costs to upgrade these with threat-
informed surveillance capabilities would quantify potential roadblocks. Additionally, 
investigating how government cybersecurity policies increase corporate costs would help 
tailor future policy efforts.  
 Finally, conducting this study for each significant adversary – China, Iran, and 
North Korea – would enable policymakers to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
entire threat landscape by identifying specific warning signs for each country's OCO. If 
all adversaries exhibit detectable cyber traits that IT-OT monitoring could measure, this 
will ensure the technique's broad effectiveness – although negative or neutral results 
would be equally revealing. 
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Appendix One: Continuous Diagnostic Mitigation (CDM) Program 
The CDM program is one of the primary US federal cybersecurity programs run 
by CISA and works across all civilian agencies. First developed in 2012 under DHS, 
CISA took over CDM in 2018 after the agency's formation. However, unlike EINSTEIN 
3 Accelerated, which extends to the private-sector, CDM only protects government 
networks.164 The program uses custom dashboards to receive and aggregate data from 
several government entities using a contracting solution to distribute sensors to federal, 
state, and local civilian agencies. Data fusion from all government levels enables CISA to 
conduct asset, identity, network security, and data protection management on a large 
scale.165 
       Most importantly, this is another example of IT-OT monitoring because the 
program can monitor and fuse information from multiple networks. CDM gives CISA the 
capability to provide defense services across the .gov domain, and its cloud architecture 
enables easy technological integration.166 The program remains a staple of US 










Appendix Two: Responding to Counter Arguments in the Context of the Study's 
Methodological Approach 
 The study's methodology focuses on understanding past Russian cyber behavior 
trends to see if they create the conditions necessary for successful IT-OT monitoring. 
Understandably, the reliance on older data runs the risk of building an outdated study; 
however, this is unavoidable given restrictions in this field face. Prominent scholars who 
study Russian cyber capabilities such as Connell, Vogler, and Giles use similar 
methodology. Connell and Vogler use past Russian cyber behavior as the foundation of 
trend analysis for specific defensive recommendations.167,168 Avoiding this 
methodological problem would require access to current cyber threat data, usually not 
publicly accessible until after an attack. 
Furthermore, this study goes beyond understanding an established defensive 
technique, IT-OT monitoring, to claim that it would stop Russian cyber-attacks. The goal 
is to conduct foundational analysis to see if Russian offensive cyber tactics telegraph 
specific warning signs that IT-OT monitoring would detect given Moscow's specific 
destructive approach to offensive cyber. The current scholarship does show that IT-OT 
monitoring is broadly effective – this is why DHS recommends systems with threat-
informed surveillance capabilities. However, the literature does not extend to adversary-
specific analysis – a gap this study aims to fill. Current research on threat-informed 
surveillance is mostly at the system-level by analyzing specific types of technologies' 
weaknesses. With increasing aggressive Russian attacks on critical infrastructure, it is 
crucial to validate if IT-OT monitoring has the same degree of effectiveness claimed at 
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the aggregate level. Unfavorable results can appear even if a study claims average 
positive results and each adversary is unique. The second defining component of this 
study is to provide policy recommendations on implementing IT-OT monitoring, given 
the lessons of US reform failures in the 2000s. These recommendations, combined with 
adversary-specific analysis, make the study unique among current scholarship.  
Although testing baseline effectiveness is a less glamorous endeavor, it is crucial 
before more policy-specific research can occur. For example, a natural next-step for 
future research would be to understand why infrastructure providers do not use IT-OT 
monitoring more widely to defend against Russian cyber-attacks. However, studying 
reasons behind adoption rates, or lack thereof, rests on understanding threat-informed 
surveillance's effectiveness. If Russian tactics do not display detectable behavioral traits, 
then IT-OT monitoring would be ineffective against Russian offensive cyber and 
exploring the adoption rate would be meaningless. Whether effectiveness is positive, 
negative, or neutral, each outcome shapes the next research stage when analyzing 
adoption rate drivers.  
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Appendix Three: Defining a Political Structure and the Role of Government 
 This study investigates critical relationships between the private and public 
sectors, which necessitates an understanding of "political structures" and the 
government's role. The study considers political structures a balanced relationship 
between two entities. In the US, this manifests as checks and balances between branches 
of the federal government. However, political structures may also extend to non-
governmental organizations because policy affects both public and private groups. In the 
context of this study, a political structure refers to a balanced relationship between the 
public and private sector, and building this requires compromises from both sides. Just as 
checks and balances force a compromise in the law-making process, a stable political 
structure between private and public organizations requires each side to be willing to find 
a middle ground. The concept of balance is vital to a functioning political structure 
because if neither group compromises, progress becomes limited. In cybersecurity, the 
government needs to be willing to accommodate private firms' needs by streamlining 
requirements, and corporations must consider policy desires by investing in network 
defense. 
 The context of cybersecurity and achieving a balanced political relationship 
between private and public entities also requires an understanding of the government's 
role in securing private goods. This study demonstrates that the private sector is 
responsible for several critical infrastructure services that provide public goods – power, 
for example. Public goods are also the government's responsibility, and now that cyber 
capabilities can threaten these services, a balance between both groups is necessary. 
Although corporations are responsible for monitoring their networks, the government 
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must ensure that these defenses can stop dangerous adversaries. However, government 
mandates and requirements are not the answer to a balanced relationship, as American 
cybersecurity reforms demonstrated in the 2000s. Working relationships require 
policymakers to understand corporations' needs and create laws that help firms achieve 
political goals by providing them with resources instead of overbearing requirements. In 
exchange, the private sector must understand policy needs and be willing to work with 
the government to achieve broader strategic needs – in this case, building better cyber 
defenses. The study's recommendations follow these ideals and focus on creating tools or 
streamlined processes that can help firms secure their networks. Rather than creating 
mandates, which can result in decreased cooperation, the proposals attempt to make the 
government a supportive partner in cybersecurity to build a positive collaborative 
relationship with private organizations. The cybersecurity political structure balances 
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